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In recent years, philosophers, political scientists and sociologists have witnessed a 
renaissance of the concept of the common good in political discourse: political agents such 
as parties, civic networks and courts increasingly refer to this concept to justify their 
actions. This development gives rise to the question whether normative political theory 
can provide a sensible definition of the common good which is compatible with pluralistic 
democratic society and which allows the identification of a specific range of well justified 
policies. The most influential account in this field is the theory of proceduralism which 
holds that the common good consists, by necessity, in the output of a political system 
whose procedures grant each citizen an equal say in collective decision-making. This 
account derives its initial plausibility from acknowledging citizens as agents who 
autonomously shape the welfare of their community on the basis of their subjective 
interests. However, it falls short of explaining how democratic decision-making good 
could possibly authorize actions that are detrimental to the common good. This problem 
is solved by a modification of the proceduralist paradigm that complements procedural 
criteria with objective and substantive standards that serve as limiting values for 
admissible policy outputs.
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For more than a decade, philosophers, political scientists and legal theorists 
have witnessed a “renaissance of the idea of the common good” (offe 2012: 
3) in political discourse: political agents such as parties, civic networks and 
courts increasingly refer to the concept of the common good in order to 
justify their actions or criticize the actions of political antagonists (amitai 
2004; riordan 2008). the revitalization of this political concept is largely 
due to a growing discontent with the classical liberal model of political 
legitimacy advocated by theorists such as rawls (1971, 2005) and dworkin 
(1977). contrary to classical liberalism, it is argued that legitimacy cannot be 
reduced to a just consideration of individual claim-rights on certain divisible 
goods (e.g. rights, societal positions, income, health services) but that it 
must as well account for the collective interests of society as a whole (taylor 
1995, 2003; Freeman 2000).
this renaissance of the common good, however, is also met with skepticism 
by many theorists: First, the very concept is considered inimical to a 
pluralistic democratic society. assuming a normative entity such as the 
common good of a community, critics argue, amounts to prescribing a pre-
existing “common way of life” (Kymlicka 1997, 226) to which all citizens 
must adhere. this common way of life would severely restrict the scope 
of admissible political decisions, factually rendering democratic decision-
making, which allows all citizens – regardless of gender, religion, or sexual 
orientation – to assert their interests in an equal fashion illegitimate. 
second, it is questionable whether the concept really “points to a clearly 
definable range of considerations in support of a policy” (Barry 1964, 1). 
rather, the suspicion suggests itself, that appeals to the common good are, 
as Barry aptly puts it, nothing but “a handy smoke-screen” (Barry 1964, 
1) employed by political agents to ensure support for their particularistic 
goals; apart from this merely rhetorical function the concept is too vague to 
serve any normative role in political discourse.
If political philosophy is to provide a sensible definition of the common 
good – thus taking account of the discontent with classical liberalism 
by expanding its model of political legitimacy –, it must deal with this 
criticism by showing, first, that the concept of the common good, properly 
understood, is not inimical to pluralistic democratic society; and, second, 
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that it serves to identify a specific range of policies and hence fulfills an 
important role in political discourse. in the following, i will argue that the 
paradigm of proceduralism which is advocated by several contemporary 
democratic theorists comes close to fulfilling these two requirements but 
must be modified in significant respects to provide a convincing definition 
of the common good.
the central thesis of proceduralism which, in its modern form, harks back to 
the works of schubert (1960) and Fraenkel (1964, 1991) is the following:
The common good consists in the output of a political system whose procedures 
meet specific normative 
and functional standards of adequacy.
Normative standards of adequacy are generally defined in terms of 
democratic conditions that guarantee the fair and equal participation 
of all citizens in collective decision-making processes (offe 2012, 16); 
the functional adequacy of a political system is determined by its 
responsiveness to the citizens’ asserted interests and by its effectiveness 
and efficiency in implementing them through policies (Putnam 1992, 
63-73)1. the basic model of proceduralism is best understood as an input-
output structure: the input into the political system consists in the 
citizens’ interests that are asserted via participatory procedures (elections, 
referendums, petitions etc.). the asserted interests are received by the 
system’s institutions and implemented through policies (laws, budget 
resolutions, executive decisions etc.) which – taken as a whole – constitute 
the system’s output.
Two aspects of the proceduralist paradigm are of special significance for 
its assessment: First, proceduralists claim that a sensible theory does not 
require any substantive concretization of the common good itself (e.g. in 
the form of a list of collective goods) but must only specify formal criteria 
for political procedures; if the latter are fulfilled by a political system, 
that system’s output necessarily constitutes the common good. this thesis 
is encapsulated in gutman’s & thompson’s claim that “once the right 
procedures are in place, whatever emerges from them is right” (gutman and 
1 the question of how to specify exactly these criteria and how to balance them against each 
other in cases of conflict is of course a pressing matter for normative democratic theory that has 
engendered a vital debate. since i am interested in assessing the plausibility of the proceduralist 
paradigm as such – and not in its concretizations – i shall not delve into this issue; for an 
overview see christiano (2006).
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thompson 2004, 24). consequently, proceduralists deny that the output of a 
system can be criticized as detrimental to the common good by any criteria 
other than the standards of normative and functional adequacy themselves.
second, proceduralists tend to argue only negatively for the plausibility 
of their paradigm by claiming that any substantive, i.e. non-procedural, 
concept of the common good is unsustainable: if political theory sought to 
provide a substantive definition of the common good (such as “the common 
good consists of collective goods x, y, z and must be realized by actions p, 
q, r”), it would undermine the legitimacy of democratic governance by pre-
empting the output of collective decision-making (Fraenkel 1964, 1991, 300f.; 
gutman and thompson 2004, 25). Put in less technical terms: if there was 
already a substantive definition of the common good (offered by political 
theorists), there would be no need for citizens to engage in voting or public 
deliberation; the reasonable consequence would instead be a paternalistic 
governance by political theorists, because the latter would ensure that the 
common good is indeed realized. since this inference, however, is clearly 
unacceptable for ethical reasons, substantive theories must be rejected – 
and proceduralism remains as the sole alternative.
this brief sketch illustrates the advantages as well as the indeterminacy of 
the proceduralist paradigm. on the one hand, proceduralism appears to be 
the ideal candidate for fulfilling the requirements of a sensible theory of the 
common good: Not only does it provide a definition that is compatible with 
a pluralistic democratic society by positing that the common good must 
be understood as the output of fair and functional democratic procedures 
in which each citizen – irrespective of gender, sexual orientation, or 
religion – has an equal say, it also allows the identification of a specific 
range of policies, since for determining whether a political action is indeed 
conducive to the common good, we must simply ascertain whether it has 
been authorized by fair and functional democratic procedures. on the other 
hand, the fact that proceduralists argue only negatively for the plausibility 
of their paradigm gives reason for concern about a positive corroboration of 
proceduralism. even if the negative argument was sound and substantive 
theories of the common good were unsustainable, there would remain 
the possibility that the proceduralist paradigm itself contains (tacit) 
premises that are indefensible. in the following, i will hence reconstruct 
the normative premises to which proceduralism ought to be rationally 
committed and determine, whether those serve as a convincing basis for the 
central thesis of proceduralism.
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the most promising normative basis from which to reconstruct the 
proceduralist paradigm is, in my view, the theory of metaethical subjectivism 
(Wiggins 1987, 1998; sumner 1995)2. this theory is based on the thesis that 
the ethically good (in our case, the common good) consists in the realization 
of the actual interests of individuals (in our case, the citizens of a political 
community). the notion of interest refers to a class of conscious mental 
states in which persons desire, prefer or seek certain states of affairs that 
are considered valuable by them. since interests, thus understood, are 
accessible introspectively by their bearers, they can be intersubjectively 
communicated in the form of truth-apt propositional statements and 
asserted via participatory procedures. the punchline of metaethical 
subjectivism is that states of affairs derive their value exclusively from 
the fact that they are valued by individuals. this implies, in turn, that 
any statement according to which a collectively valued state of affairs is 
unethical is not simply false but meaningless.
the appeal of metaethical subjectivism with regard to the personal level is 
that it takes persons seriously as autonomous authors of their individual 
welfare and closes the door on paternalistic interventions (arneson 2005). 
With regard to the political level, metaethical subjectivism helps to make 
sense of the notion of popular sovereignty that is central to democratic 
societies. according to this notion, democratic citizens must be understood 
as agents who autonomously shape the welfare of their community on the 
basis of their collective will3.  the subjectivist foundation of proceduralism 
can be summarized by a principle that i call the sovereignty principle:
sovereignty principle: the citizens of a political community possess 
defining power over the common good.
2 this does not mean, of course, that proceduralism necessarily implies metaethical 
subjectivism. Following condorcet (1785, 1972), one might also argue for an objectivist version of 
proceduralism. this approach would have to assume the following premises: (1) the common good 
is constituted by objective ethical criteria that are epistemically accessible; (2) political systems 
serve the purpose of identifying said criteria and implementing them through policies; (3) it is 
possible to specify formal standards of adequacy which guarantee the reliable identification and 
implementation of said criteria. From these premises, it follows that the common good necessarily 
consists in the output of an adequate system because that system’s procedures are sufficiently 
reliable so as to always identify and implement the criteria that constitute the common good. 
i think, however, that this account is vastly implausible. For one, i am skeptical of any theory 
which holds that the notion of welfare (be it individual or collective) can be defined in purely 
objective terms, but i shall not dwell on this issue here. it should be evident that the third premise 
is untenable. apart from logical inference-forms there is no epistemic procedure that guarantees 
success. But this is exactly the assumption which defenders of the objectivist approach must hold, 
since otherwise the above-mentioned conclusion would not follow.
3 this conception of popular sovereignty that seems so familiar and almost trivial to us nowadays 
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By the expression “defining power” I simply mean that the common good 
of a given society is defined by the interests of that society’s citizens and 
that the latter are conceptually and metaphysically prior to the common 
good. accordingly, the positive value of a certain political action for the 
furthering of the common good is a function of the respective valuing of 
that action by the members of society themselves.
even though the sovereignty principle constitutes the foundation of 
the proceduralist paradigm as i understand it, it is – taken by itself – 
underdetermined. the reason is that one cannot assume a priori that all citizens 
always and immediately agree on the states of affairs that are conducive to the 
common good. on the contrary, it is more realistic to assume a high degree of 
dissent on this issue in modern pluralistic societies. the sovereignty principle 
thus only stipulates that the citizens possess defining power over the common 
good; it does not specify, however, how this defining power is to be realized and 
how to deal with the problem of dissent. this question is answered by a second 
principle which i call the procedural principle:
procedural principle: the citizens of a political community exercise 
their defining power over the common good through political 
procedures that allow them to assert their interests and that meet 
certain normative standards of participatory equality and functional 
standards of effectiveness and efficiency.
The introduction of procedures that facilitate the citizen’s defining power 
over the common good gives rise to two new questions that are reflected in 
the above mentioned standards: first, there is the normative question of how 
much weight to accord to the respective interests of the various citizens 
that constitute the community. second, there is the practical question of how 
to design the procedures to ensure that the citizens’ asserted interests are 
indeed implemented through policies.
The normative standards of participatory equality can be justified in two 
steps. First, we can posit as a default assumption that the interests of each 
citizen must be considered equally in the political process of determining the 
common good. christiano argues with great force for the inevitability of this 
assumption by stating that “[t]his equality proceeds from the importance of 
interests as well as the separateness of persons. […] no one’s interests matter 
more than anyone else’s.” (christiano 2004, 269) this premise, however, 
does not necessitate a claim on participatory equality by all citizens. if one 
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assumes, realistically, that some citizens possess more political knowledge 
than others, one might well argue that the equal consideration of interests is 
best served by a regime of paternalistic experts (estlund 2008, 30f.). to arrive 
at the standard of participatory equality it is thus necessary to provide, in 
the second step, a sound argument against paternalism. the most convincing 
argument proceeds from the anthropological fact that most persons are 
struck with a “cognitive bias” (christiano 2001, 205) in regard to their own 
interests. even citizens who are benevolently inclined towards others and 
who possess superior knowledge are at risk of misrepresenting the desires of 
others because of their necessarily limited individual perspective. to obviate 
these negative effects of cognitive bias on the determination of the common 
good it must be ensured that all citizens receive the same rights to assert their 
interests through political participation.
Compared to the normative standards of equality, the justification of 
the standards of functionality requires far less argumentative effort. if 
political procedures are to serve the purpose of facilitating the exercise 
of defining power, they must ensure that the citizens’ interests do not 
simply “seep away” or are distorted by political decision-makers but 
are indeed realized through adequate policies. they must be, in other 
words, effective. Furthermore, one must assume that political procedures 
generally operate under conditions of relatively scarce material and 
temporal resources. this leads to the requirement that procedures must 
make optimal use of the available resources in the implementation of 
policies, i.e., they must be efficient.
now that the sovereignty principle and the procedural principle have been 
established, there is a normative foundation to substantiate the central 
thesis of the proceduralist paradigm: the common good consists in the 
output of a normatively and functionally adequate political system because 
it represents the fair, effective and efficient realization of the citizens’ 
asserted interests which, in turn, determine the content of common good 
itself. On this reading, the political system fulfills the function of realizing 
the citizens’ defining power over the common good, and accordingly its 
output represents the result of the exercise of that defining power.
although the central thesis of proceduralism can be positively corroborated by 
the theory of metaethical subjectivism it is, as i now shall argue, open to severe 
criticism – a fact which necessitates a critical re-evaluation of the proceduralist 
tenet that the common good can be determined exclusively on the grounds of 
4. 
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formal procedural standards. The flaw of the proceduralist paradigm based on 
metaethical subjectivism is that it cannot explain how citizens could be in error 
about the common good.
the decisive argument has already been put forward by rousseau in the 
Social Contract where he states: “our will is always for our own good, but we 
do not always see what that is.” (rousseau 1762, 2008, 66). rousseau’s point is 
that citizens’ political interests may be fundamentally misguided and hence, 
when realized, not conducive to the common good but irrelevant or even 
detrimental to it. the reasons for such misguided interests are manifold: 
citizens may be misinformed about politically relevant states of affairs, 
they may lack significant information, or they may draw inconsistent 
inferences from accurate information (schumpeter 1976, 262; caplan 2007). 
thus, it appears intuitively plausible that even political actions which are 
collectively authorized by fair and functional democratic procedures may 
fail to ascertain the common good because their underlying interests are 
deficient in the above mentioned respects. In the terminology of the input-
output model from section 2, we might say that in such cases a deficient 
input generates a deficient output.
The flaw of proceduralism, as I have reconstructed it, is that it categorically 
denies this possibility. it claims that in order to determine the common good 
we must simply implement and observe the standards of fair equality and 
functionality because the latter guarantee an adequate realization of the 
citizens’ interests which, in turn, are deemed constitutive of the common 
good. if it is, however, implausible to assume (for the above reasons) that 
the citizens’ interests necessarily constitute their common good, then the 
implementation and observance of the procedural standards guarantees by 
no means that their output is indeed conducive to the common good.
now the defenders of proceduralism might resort to what i call an idealization 
strategy. they might say: “of course we do not mean that that common 
good consists in the output of a system whose members are ill-informed 
about relevant political matters. that would be absurd! We rather mean 
that it consists in a system’s output as it would result if its members were 
fully informed and rational.” in my view, this strategy which has been 
employed e.g. by dahl (1989) and cohen (1989) constitutes a pyrrhic victory 
for proceduralism. if one substitutes the actual citizens’ defining power over 
the common good by the defining power of hypothetical agents (who possess 
all the skills and information that their actual counterparts lack), one 
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severs the proceduralist paradigm from the normative foundation that has 
lent it its plausibility in the first place – the notion of popular sovereignty. 
By arguing that the common good ought to be understood as the output 
of procedures that are observed by hypothetical agents, the defenders of 
proceduralism deny that the actual citizens are fit to determine the common 
good themselves via democratic decision-making. From this point it seems to 
be only a short way to justifying a paternalistic regime, which is a conclusion 
that proceduralists have firmly sought to avoid in the first place.
it appears that the defenders of proceduralism are caught in a dilemma: 
either they stick with their central thesis, but then they must deny, rather 
implausibly, that actual citizens could be in error about the common good. 
Or they supplant the actual citizens’ defining power over the common 
good with the theoretical construct of the input of counterfactually fully 
informed and rational agents, but then they are on a straight path towards 
paternalism and forego the initial advantages of their approach. I find both 
alternatives equally unsatisfactory which is why I will propose a significant 
modification to the proceduralist paradigm in the final section.
since traditional proceduralism as based on the theory of metaethical 
subjectivism fails and since i do not see another way to corroborate its 
central thesis, I propose a modification to the paradigm that restricts the 
original tenet described in section 2 according to which the common good 
can be defined exclusively on grounds of formal, procedural standards. The 
alternative definition that I suggest is the following: 
The common good consists in the output of a political system if and only if (a) 
that system’s procedures meet specific standards of normative and functional 
adequacy and (b) that output does not violate specific substantive and 
objective standards of adequacy that are determined by experts.
The difference to traditional proceduralism is that in my qualified version 
the procedural authorization of a political action is only a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for its conduciveness to the common good. This 
modification allows the preservation of the citizen’s defining power over 
the common good (though in a bounded sense) while solving the problem of 
error that i have addressed in section 4.
let me start by saying what i consider to be the valuable point of traditional 
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think, that the populace of a democratic community must be acknowledged 
as a group of agents who autonomously shape their collective welfare via 
democratic decision-making. In my view, the flaw of proceduralism is not 
that it acknowledges the citizens’ defining power over the common good; the 
problem is that it overstates the point by making the common good exclusively 
dependent on the citizens’ asserted interests and thus denies the possibility of 
error. consequently, the challenge consists in developing a theory that takes 
into account the citizens defining power and acknowledges that they might 
still be in error about the common good. this twofold requirement, however, 
cannot be met by the defenders of traditional proceduralism as they find 
themselves caught in the dilemma that i have sketched at the end of section 4.
in my view, the only rational solution to this problem is to scale down the 
status of democratically exercised defining power from a necessary and 
sufficient condition to a merely necessary condition: on this account, it is 
necessary for an action’s conduciveness to the common good that it reflects 
the citizens subjective interests which are asserted via normatively and 
functionally adequate democratic procedures; it is, however, not sufficient, 
since those interests may still be ill-conceived in regard to certain standards 
that transcend the citizens’ subjective perspectives. such standards must 
fulfill two conditions. First, they must be objective in the sense that they 
are independent of the citizens’ actual interests as well as epistemically 
accessible, so that they can serve to identify and criticize interests that are 
misguided (i.e. irrelevant or detrimental) with regard to the common good. 
second, they must be substantive (i.e. non-procedural), for the simple reason 
that they must serve the purpose of criticizing the value of outputs that 
otherwise satisfy all standards of procedural adequacy.
now the question emerges as to how to concretize these objective and 
substantive standards of adequacy beyond the rather abstract indications 
that i have given here. i think, however, that this is not a task for political 
philosophy but for empirical experts who deal with specific areas of political 
interest. here is a short example to support my point. in recent years, 
there has been a heated debate in germany about the legal instrument of 
preventive detention (Flaig 2009). the supporters of a stricter criminal law 
who held the majority in both legislative chambers argued that it would 
serve the common good to pass a set of laws that allow the indefinite 
detention of imprisoned criminals if psychological evaluation indicates 
that they will pose a threat to the public once they are released. according 
to traditional proceduralism, the respective laws, which were eventually 
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passed in 2004 with great public approval, would have had to be considered 
conducive to the common good for the simple reason that they were 
authorized by fair and functional democratic procedures.
since then, however, empirical inquiry by criminologists has shown that the 
proponents of said laws have based their argument on a misconception: in 
fact, the psychological evaluation of imprisoned persons does not provide 
an accurate prediction of their future criminal conduct (Kinzig 2008, alex 
2010). thus, it must be assumed that the vast majority of persons who have 
been indefinitely detained on the basis of these laws do not pose a threat 
to the public after all and that the respective legal instrument has no 
significant impact on collective welfare. In the terminology of my version 
of qualified proceduralism this insight constitutes the identification of an 
objective and substantive standard by experts, since it serves to identify and 
criticize the output of fair and functional procedures as irrelevant to the 
common good.
even if this example supports my argument there is one last problem that 
must be addressed. in section 2 i sketched the negative argument employed 
by proceduralists in order to buttress their account. this argument states 
that traditional proceduralism is the only ethically acceptable theory of 
the common good, since any account that provides substantive criteria of 
the common good pre-empts the outcome of democratic decision-making 
and leads to paternalism. i believe, though, that this argument does not 
undermine my account of qualified proceduralism. It would only do so if 
the stipulated objective and substantive standards were considered to be 
necessary and sufficient for the determination of the common good. However, 
i have argued that in order for an action to be conducive to the common 
good it must – apart from not violating substantive and objective standards 
– also be authorized by the populace itself, otherwise it would not reflect the 
general will of the sovereign citizens. consequently, democratic decision-
making fulfills an indispensible function in my account of the common good; 
i merely hold that it may be based on misguided interests and hence requires 
examination by experts who possess superior knowledge in the respective 
areas of political concern.
christian Blum universität zu Köln
DeteRMininG the CoMMon GooD:  
a (Re-)ConstRuCtiVe CRitique of the PRoCeDuRalist PaRaDiGM
187
REFERENCES
alex, m. (2010), nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung: ein rechtsstaatliches und 
kriminalpolitisches debakel, Felix-Verlag, holzkirchen, 2010;
amitai, e. (2004), The Common good, Polity Press, cambridge, m.a., 2004;
Arneson, R.J. (2005), “Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard 
Paternalism”, legal Theory 11 (3), 2005, pp. 269-284;
Barry, B. (1964), “the Public interest”, Proceedings of the aristotelian Society, 
supplementary Volumes 38, 1964, pp. 1-18;
caplan, B. (2007), The myth of the rational Voter: Why democracies Choose Bad 
Policies, Princeton university
Press, Princeton, 2007;
Christiano, T. (2001), “Knowledge and Power in the Justification of 
democracy”, australasian Journal
of democracy 79 (2), 2001, pp. 197-215;
christiano, t. (2004), “the authority of democracy”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 12 (3), 2004, pp. 266-290;
christiano, t. (2006), “democracy”, in Zalta (ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, the metaphysics
research lab, stanford, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy;
cohen, J. (1989), “deliberation and democratic legitimacy”, in hamlin and 
Pettit (eds.), The good Polity:
normative analysis of the State, Basil Blackwell, oxford, 1989, pp. 17-34;
condorcet, J.a. (1785, 1972), essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des 
decisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, chelsea Publ. co, new york;
dahl, r.a. (1989), democracy and its Critics, yale university Press, new haven-
london, 1989;
dworkin, r. (1977), Taking rights Seriously, harvard university Press, 
cambridge, m.a., 1977;
estlund, d.m. (2008), democratic authority: a Philosophical framework, Princeton 
university Press, Princeton, 2008;
Flaig, a. (2009), die nachträgliche Sicherungsverwahrung, Peter lang Verlag, 
Frankfurt a.m, 2009;
Fraenkel, e. (1964, 1991), deutschland und die westlichen demokratien, 
suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.m;
Freeman, s. (2000), “deliberative democracy: a sympathetic comment”,  
Philosophy and Public affairs
29 (4), 2000, pp. 371-418;
gutman, a. and thompson, d. (2004), Why deliberative democracy?, Princeton 
university Press, Princeton-oxford, 2004;
Kinzig, J. (2008), die legalbewährung gefährlicher rückfalltäter: zugleich ein 
christian Blum universität zu Köln
DeteRMininG the CoMMon GooD:  
a (Re-)ConstRuCtiVe CRitique of the PRoCeDuRalist PaRaDiGM
188
Beitrag zur entwicklung des rechts der Sicherungsverwahrung, duncker and 
humblot, Berlin, 2008;
Kymlicka, W. (1997), Contemporary Political Philosophy: an introduction, oxford 
university Press, oxford-new york, 1997;
offe, c. (2012), “Whose good is the common good?”, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, 2012, pp. 1-20;
Putnam, r.d. (1992), making democracy Work: Civic Traditions in modern italy, 
Princeton university Press,
Princeton-oxford, 1992;
rawls, J. (1971, 2005), a Theory of Justice, harvard university Press, cambridge, 
m.a.;
riordan, P. (2008), a grammar of the Common good: Speaking of globalization, 
continuum, london-new york, 2008;
rousseau, J.J. (1762, 2008), The Social Contract, transl. by c. Betts, oxford university 
Press, oxford-new york;
schubert, g. (1960), The Public interest: a Critique of the Theory of a Political 
Concept, Free Press of glencoe,
glencoe, 1960;
schumpeter, J.a. (1942, 1976), Capitalism, Socialism and democracy, harper & 
row, new york;
sumner, l.W. (1995), “the subjectivity of Welfare”, ethics 105 (4), 1995, pp. 
764-790;
taylor, c.  (1995, 2003), “cross-Purposes: the liberal-communitarian debate”, in 
matravers and Pike (eds.),
debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: an anthology, routledge, london-
new york;
Wiggins, d. (1987, 1998), needs, Values, Truth: essays in the Philosophy of Value, 
oxford university Press usa, new york.
christian Blum universität zu Köln
DeteRMininG the CoMMon GooD:  
a (Re-)ConstRuCtiVe CRitique of the PRoCeDuRalist PaRaDiGM
